Abstract
Introduction
The field of long-term trusted archiving is most relevant mainly because the number of digital documents that need to be preserved for long periods of time has increased significantly over last years. This has happened due to the increased adoption of IT support in business and the dematerialization of business. In near and long term future the number of interacting computers, mobile phones and data processing devices will further increase. The collaborations between owners of these devices will increasingly be set up in an ad-hoc manner. In such an environment an increasing amount of additional contracts is being set up between different parties. These documents range from service acceptance contracts, service level agreements, privacy related agreements and other digital documents of legal origin that need to be preserved over longer periods of time.
Companies and businesses need to store and preserve different forms of digital data for long periods of time. The length of required availability of data may exceed the life span of electronic formats and cryptographic mechanisms used to store and preserve authenticity of the data and hence it legal validity. Longevity of digital data is affected both by technical changes and by technical progress. Therefore it can be reduced by many different processes and events. Such as (but not limited to):
• the lifetime of digitally signed data often exceeds the validity periods of public-key certificates used to verify digital signatures
• the lifetime of digitally signed data can exceed the period during which the length of cryptographic keys used to generate the signatures, becomes too short to stand against brute force attacks, which may become possible because of increased computational capabilities of general public.
• The lifetime of digitally signed data can exceed the cryptanalysis period of the cryptographic algorithms used to generate the signatures. Preservation of document integrity over longer periods of time is a challenging task and companies struggle with it. Some companies integrate solutions that address longevity problems available on the market such as eKeeper, Archisoft and others struggle to develop and maintain their own proprietary solutions. The whole process of managing and maintaining integrity and authenticity of digital documents over long periods of time is a complex task, both technically and organizationally. In this paper we approach the problem from a different perspective: we identify the solution parts that are common to many contexts where such solutions are applied and describe the solution parts as patterns. We achieve this by abstracting particular solution and best practices to a more generic level and capture this knowledge in form of patterns.
Capturing knowledge in form of patterns
The first ideas of capturing software development best practices in form of patterns originated over a decade ago by the Gang of Four (Error! Reference source not found.). Recently the idea of patterns has been adapted and successfully applied to various fields of IT and more specifically to the field of IT security and dependability (S&D) as well. At least three different approaches towards S&D patterns have been introduced: The Serenity project approach (Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found.), the Open Group approach (Error! Reference source not found.) and the Schumacher et al. approach (Error! Reference source not found.).
Patterns capture generic and proven solutions to problems that occur in specific context. They capture the problem description, the context of the problem and the generic solution as well, and are as such independent of any particular technology. Patterns should provide guidance how they can be successfully implemented, integrated and deployed in different environments with different specifics. Because patterns are seldom fully independent they may also contain references to other patterns (Error! Reference source not found. • Generic Solution: It is a high level representation of reorganization of resources and cooperation between agents and devices that is needed to solve the requirements to the generic problem. The solutions are described in form of plain text and additionally modeled and presented in the form of diagrams (can be UML diagrams and sometimes also non standard schemas).
• Dependence on other patterns: Patterns are not isolated blocks and may therefore often depend on other patterns and reuse them for achieving generalized requirements through solutions. The pattern should specify which part of the solution is part of itself and which parts are provided by other patterns that can also be considered as a kind of solution preconditions. The scope of dependencies of patterns may often extent from technical domains to the domain of organization and business. The long term trusted archiving patterns described in this paper often used and integrated in organizational solutions. Although such organizational solutions are not subject of this paper they may define the boundaries of the pattern described.
• Specific context implementation guidelines: A pattern description my contain guidelines and examples of application of the pattern to specific situations and contexts. The adaptations that were required to map the generic solution to a specific context should be described as part of the pattern itself.
Security and Dependability Properties and prerequisites relevant to long-term archiving
A long-term archive service must be capable of providing evidence that can be used to demonstrate the integrity of data for which it is responsible, from the time it received the data until the expiration of the archival period of the data. Following these guidelines the main security properties that long-term trusted archive should provide are the following (see [2] ):
• Proof-of-document-integrity: evidence that can be used to demonstrate the integrity of a digital document object at a given time must be available
• Authenticity-of-time-origin: The point in time when a document has entered the archive should be authentic. It must be possible to demonstrate the existence of a digital document at a given time.
• Authenticity-of-document-source: It should be possible to prove that certain digital document was produced by certain entity. The main dependability property that needs to be ensured by long-term electronic archiving services is:
• Durability-of-evidence: all security properties provided by archive should not necessarily be limited to any particular time frame and should be perpetuate. Techniques for preserving integrity, maintaining proofs of authenticity or time origin of digital data used in long-term archiving services (LTA) today are based on (i) cryptographic hashing techniques, (ii) digital signatures and (iii) public key infrastructures (PKI) (see [3] , [4] and [5] ).
Long term trusted archiving patterns
In this section we identify and briefly describe the generic solutions and capture them as patterns. The identified patterns were not proved in a formal way, because they were extracted from long-term trusted archiving good practices, which are captured in the different internet standards and standard drafts (see [6] , [7] ).
Pattern 1: Time stamping via trusted Time Stamping Authority
In order for paper like documents to be legally binding and valid they are first dated, then stamped and signed by a notary. Doing so, the notary acknowledges both the document is authentic and its date is valid. In case when the document is signed the authenticity of the signers' identities can be checked and acknowledged by notary as well. Trusted time stamping uses the same principle: the date is first appended to the fingerprint of a digital document and then the combination is digitally signed (see [8] ). There are two parties involved in the process. The first is the user protecting the document against both content and date forgery. The requesting party that requests the timestamp is referred to as user and the party providing timestamps is referred to as Time Stamping Authority (TSA). These two parties are represented as 2 distinct roles. Properties provided by this S&D class are: TimeOrigin-Authenticity and Proof-of-document-integrity.
Both properties are limited in duration. Typically the duration period of the properties is bound to the validity period of TSA's private key used in production of a timestamp. In order for the TSA to guarantee the mentioned properties, the user needs to trust the TSA to deliver valid timestamps. The trust is established if the following preconditions are met:
• TSA should be using a trusted time source for timestamping
• TSA's private key's purpose of usage needs to be in line with timestamping and TSA's certificate needs to be issued by a trusted PKI issuer
• TSA's public key certificate needs to be available and valid In order for pattern to be valid and to provide the S&D properties during the runtime operations, the following conditions need to be monitored:
• The availability of TSA's time stamping servers
Pattern 2: Concatenation of cryptographic hash values
Concatenating hash values means that a party calculates n different hash values of the same digital document produced by different hash algorithms. The redundant hash value information is stored and maintained as a proof of integrity of the digital document and provides proof of integrity which is resilient against particular hash algorithms becoming weak and obsolete. This dependability property is called hash-algorithm-attack-resilient-proof-ofintegrity.However the redundancy of information storage does not yield any extra cryptographic security properties. The method of combining different hash values is more resilient if different types of hashing algorithms are used. The concatenation of hash values produced by n different redundant hash algorithms produces a single value which is called hash concatenation. The hash concatenation should be maintained as proof of integrity along with the ordered list of hashing algorithms used in concatenation. Both master hash and hash algorithm list are required for verification.In case of specific hash algorithm targeted cryptographic attacks the probability of other algorithms staying secure is high if the cryptographic hash algorithms have different structure. This can be achieved by using a multitude of algorithms that belong to different "families", resulting in different structures. In case of a previously unknown, fundamentally different cryptographic attack being invented, it is possible that such an attack could render all n redundant hash algorithms obsolete and therefore all n redundant hash values will not provide the proof of integrity property anymore. It is absolutely necessary to monitor the status of cryptographic hash algorithms to be monitored continuously. When all algorithms except the last one become obsolete, the pattern does not provide resilient proof of integrity anymore but only normal proof-ofintegrity provided by one cryptographic function. In case any of the algorithms used for redundant hashing becoming weak the monitoring mechanisms should produce an event that semantically explains the loss of resiliency.
Pattern 3: Provision of evidence for groups of digital documents
Groups of either digital documents or evidences that belong together should be kept together during all phases of archiving. Submitters of data should be able to indicate which data objects belong together or comprise a group. Retrievers should be able to retrieve one, some or all members of a group of data objects. It should be possible to provide evidence for groups of archived data objects, both for the existence of each document separately and the existence of the whole group. Following the rationale above we find that there are two reasons for which one would want to store digital documents in the group: 1. The documents belong together and each of them is a part of the whole. Furthermore the group should not be considered as a whole if any of its constitute documents is missing. 2. The other reason for grouping documents together is to achieve better operational effectiveness and possible also reducing of costs, since the group can be represented as a single object that needs to be manipulated and its integrity evidences need to be preserved. The main security property provided by this S&D class is Proof-of-document-group-integrity. This property states that evidence for integrity of all documents constituting a group must be available and that it should not be possible for any of the documents to be removed or added and consequently the group could be treated as an integral whole. The property is not bound to time and can be limited in duration. Aside to the group integrity there is also a dependability property that can be provided by grouping of digital documents. This property is called the group-operational-effectiveness and it is related to the fact that archive does not necessary need to maintain vast amounts of different integrity proofs if this can be obtained in a more transparent, straightforward, maintainable and cost-effective manner. The patterns used to provide the properties described above all involve combining individual hash values of corresponding digital documents and passing the concatenated data stream to another round of hashing resulting in a single piece of data called Master Hash. Master hash should be maintained and later used to provide evidence for integrity of all the documents in the group. For patterns that provide the property "Proof-ofdocument-group-integrity", the verifier can always take the group of documents and use the appropriate algorithm to create the master hash. Verifying the integrity of the group is done by comparing the calculated master hash along with the stored one. If the two are the same then the integrity of the group is guaranteed. All patterns can use different hash functions for generating hash values, provided that the selected hash functions are valid and collision resistant. Two ways how hashes can be combined into a master hash are presented: (i) sorted hash lists and (ii) hash trees.
Sorted hash lists
The individual document hashes are first binary sorted, then concatenated and passed to the cryptographic functions. For verification of group integrity one just needs a set of original documents, because the order in which they are combined does not matter, due to the binary sort operation. There are different implementations of hash lists. They differ in the cryptographic hash algorithm that is used to calculate a message digest of the data. The schematic representation of hash list creation process is shown on Figure 1 . Before the documents enter the hash value generation process they can be binary sorted or not. 
Hash trees
Hash trees are a type of data structure that contains the information about the group of documents in form of a tree. Hash trees are an extension of hash lists. In hash trees each node of the tree contains a hash value. Hash trees are built in the following manner: the individual document hashes that represent a group of documents are first mapped to the leaves of the tree nodes. Using techniques for grouping of hashes (such as concatenation of binary sorted list of individual document hashes) these hashes are further combined into a hash value that is stored in the parent node. Parent nodes are treated as children nodes and combined into new parent nodes in a repetitive fashion until only one master hash is obtained at the root of the tree. This master hash should be maintained and later provided by the verifier as evidence for integrity of the group (see Figure 2 for schematic representation on an example of a hash tree). The verifier should construct the master hash in the same way as the maintained master hash was produced and compare them. There are different implementations of hash trees. They differ in:
• The number of the children that each parent node can have.
• The way the individual hash values are combined into parent nodes.
• The cryptographic hash algorithm that is used to calculate a message digest of the data.
• The way document hashes are mapped onto leaves of the hash tree and the way mismatch between the leaves of the full tree and number of documents is handled. 
Pattern #4: Archive Timestamp chains
When documents are stored in the archive they are combined in data objects, which can contain one or more digital documents. The properties Time-OriginAuthenticity and Proof-of-document-integrity of data objects are provided by time-stamping of data objects using a Trusted Time-Stamp Authority. Integrity for groups of data objects is protected by S&D classes providing Proof-of-document-group-integrity, namely the Hash trees and Hash lists.
However the protection of a data object may be time limited. After certain time the timestamps may become invalid due to the:
• Expiration of time stamp authority's certificate
• Cryptographic hash algorithm becoming weak due to new cryptographic attack or possible brute force attacks The archive timestamp chain provides resilience to time stamp authority's (TSA) certificate ageing. This dependability property is named "Durable-resilienceto-certificate-expiration". The general principle used for generation and validation of archive timestamp chains can be demonstrated through description of a single timestamp renewal. In the single step the initial timestamp that is exposed to ageing should be assumed valid. Therefore it provides Time-Origin-Authenticity and Proof-of-document-integrity of the data object it protects (see the trusted time-stamping S&D class above for more details). The single step process of timestamp renewal consists of:
• first the initial timestamp should be proved valid,
• then the initial timestamp should be combined into a group together with proofs for validation
• and finally the group should be re-stamped into a new timestamp All this should take place before the validity of the initial timestamp is compromised. The newly produced timestamp can be used together with proofs for validation in order to show the validity of the initial timestamp. As time progresses the process of generation produces multiple timestamps organized in archive timestamp chain. Such chains gain in size as time progresses. In the process of validation the verifier needs to start with the last timestamp of the archive timestamp chain and prove the validity of the one before by referring to the proofs of validity stored in the last time stamped group. This process is recursively repeated if the preceding timestamps are proved valid until the actual data object is reached. In case validity of any of the timestamps of the archive timestamp chain can be disproved, the whole chain becomes invalid. Both processes of archive timestamp chain generation and verification are shown on Figure 3 . There are some obvious preconditions that need to be fulfilled for this pattern to be valid:
• Trusted Time Stamping pattern should be available providing proof-of-integrity and timeorigin-authenticity at each step, when re-stamping takes place
• The whole chain needs to use the same cryptographic hash algorithm for grouping and time stamping
• Each repetitive step of the generation and validation process needs to use the same cryptographic hash algorithm
• The certificate used by TSA to verify last timestamp of the chain needs to be valid
• The hash and digital signature algorithms used for grouping and time-stamping are both valid, not weak and cryptographic attack resistant The pattern should monitor whether the hash algorithm used for grouping and the digital signature algorithms used in time stamping are valid, not weak and cryptographic attack resistant.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have captured the generics of the solutions used in good practices in trusted electronic archiving. We have identified and captured those solutions as patterns and provided a core set of longterm trusted archiving security and dependability patterns on a technical level. Aside to the core patterns there are many generic operational and management techniques that need to be adopted in order to support the operational and managerial aspects of archiving. These generic solutions do not provide any security or dependability properties themselves, but they provide operational manageability to the archive (see [2] ). Some of those generic solutions might be captured as patterns in further research in this field:
• Management of suitability of cryptographic algorithms used for hashing and in digital signature schemes
• Use of operational policies for archiving of documents and operational management of many different data object archived under different archiving policies. 
